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Economic Incentives, Public Policies,
and Private Strategies to Control 
Foodborne Pathogens
By Tanya Roberts
New scientific and management knowledge in both pub-
lic and private sectors is improving economic incentives
for food safety. New threats, such as bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE, popularly known as “mad cow dis-
ease”) are altering global markets. Market incentives for
food safety are relatively weak, however, because food
safety is a credence good. Even after food has been con-
sumed, the lag between consumption and illness hinders
identification of the contaminated food. Food safety infor-
mation is improving because of new testing and surveil-
lance methods as well as new public and private control
initiatives. Better supply chain control systems are being
invented and used from farm to fork. Recent food safety
innovations have been spurred by stringent standards
demanded by large buyers—domestic and overseas—and
by regulatory agencies.
The public and private sectors are in a food safety
dance. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) systems started as a private-public partnership
to develop safer food for US astronauts. Some firms were
early adopters of HACCP to prevent pathogens from
entering, surviving, and growing in their production pro-
cesses. Starting in the mid-1990s, the Food and Drug
Administration and the United States Department of
Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service required
HACCP for seafood, meat and poultry, juice, and shell
eggs. Regulatory HACCP system requirements differ, and
each plant has to develop and monitor its own HACCP
system for the foods it produces. HACCP systems are
evolving as regulators, scientists, corporate managers, and
economists apply new scientific information, innovative
equipment, and new pathogen tests and management
strategies. Some companies are using continuous food
safety innovation as a competitive strategy.
In this issue of Choices, we explore the complex world
of global food safety and the evolving economic incentives.
The economics of food safety is a relatively new area of
research. New models and improved understanding of the
public policy/private strategy interface are bridging scien-
tific disciplines and bringing new understanding to food
safety issues. Not only are global markets at stake, but
foodborne pathogens cause acute illness in 76 million US
consumers, 5,000 deaths, and an unknown number of
chronic complications annually.
Throughout the United States, consumers rely on local
health authorities to regulate and inspect restaurants in an
attempt to assure that high-quality hygiene standards are
maintained. How effective are the regulations and inspec-
tions by public health authorities at assuring good-quality
restaurant hygiene? Jin and Leslie study restaurant hygiene
and the role played by health inspections. In January
1998, Los Angeles implemented a critical change in their
regulations leading to a dramatic improvement in restau-
rant hygiene—restaurants are required to prominently dis-
play in their window a letter-grade card (A, B, or C)
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corresponding to the result of their
most recent hygiene inspection. They
analyze a variety of different data to
assess the effects of these grade cards
on restaurant hygiene, restaurant rev-
enue, restaurant prices and output,
behavior of inspectors, and, most
importantly, the occurrence of food-
related illnesses.
Prior to the December 2003 dis-
covery of a cow with BSE in Wash-
ington State, the United States
implemented measures to prevent the
disease from entering the country
and to prevent its spread if it were
found. Following that discovery,
additional measures were introduced
both to safeguard public health and
reassure domestic and foreign con-
sumers about the safety of US beef.
Fox et al. review the various measures
that have been taken and additional
measures that have been proposed
and discuss the efficiency of the US
response to the disease.
Fearne and Garcia Martinez note
that growing concern about food
safety is pressuring government agen-
cies to be more prescriptive and pro-
active in their regulation of the food
industry. Given the scarcity of public
sector resources and the scale of the
task at hand, however, there is grow-
ing interest in the notion of coregula-
tion, with public and private sectors
working hand in hand to deliver safer
food at lower (regulatory) cost. This
paper explores the opportunities for
and some of the barriers to coregula-
tion of food safety from a UK per-
spective.
To maintain a reputation or to
meet contractual or regulatory
requirements, firms choose different
target levels of pathogen control for
various meat and poultry products.
Roberts finds that private strategies
to control pathogens are diverse and
that supply chain control is crucial.
Public information and regulations
strengthen private incentives for
pathogen control. Starbird uses a
principal agent model to examine the
design of supply chain contracts and
improve the safety of purchased
inputs. The opportunity to use sup-
ply chain contracts to improve food
safety exists even when food safety is
difficult to measure.
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